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Understanding habits at a biological level requires a combination of behavioral
observations and measures of ongoing neural activity. Theoretical frameworks as well
as definitions of habitual behaviors emerging from classic behavioral research have been
enriched by new approaches taking account of the identification of brain regions and
circuits related to habitual behavior. Together, this combination of experimental and
theoretical work has provided key insights into how brain circuits underlying action-
learning and action-selection are organized, and how a balance between behavioral
flexibility and fixity is achieved. New methods to monitor and manipulate neural activity
in real time are allowing us to have a first look “under the hood” of a habit as it is
formed and expressed. Here we discuss ideas emerging from such approaches. We pay
special attention to the unexpected findings that have arisen from our own experiments
suggesting that habitual behaviors likely require the simultaneous activity of multiple
distinct components, or operators, seen as responsible for the contrasting dynamics
of neural activity in both cortico-limbic and sensorimotor circuits recorded concurrently
during different stages of habit learning. The neural dynamics identified thus far do not
fully meet expectations derived from traditional models of the structure of habits, and
the behavioral measures of habits that we have made also are not fully aligned with these
models. We explore these new clues as opportunities to refine an understanding of habits.
Keywords: striatum, cortex, action, chunking, learning, flexibility, reward, reinforcement
There is a distinguished history of scientific attention to
habitual behaviors. In early thinking in psychology, much of
behavior was framed in terms of lack of mindfulness, and this
mode of behavior was considered as habitual. This was, and
remains, a straightforward and intuitive way of thinking. This
line of thinking was convolved with the classic reflex arcs of
Sherrington and his students, the ubiquity of habits emphasized
by William James, the “law of effect” of Thorndike, the formalized
drive theory of Hull, and with the general behaviorist research
tradition. As a consequence, many aspects of animal behavior
were viewed in terms of sensory inputs and movement outputs
linked by what we would now call neural networks (James, 1890;
Thorndike, 1898; Sherrington, 1906; Hull, 1943). As ethologic
approaches developed, views emerged emphasizing that species-
specific instinctual behaviors are characterized by a consistency
in performance similar to, or exceeding, that of learned behav-
iors (Tinbergen, 1950; Lorenz and Leyhausen, 1973). It now
is clear that even so-called simple reflex arcs lie within mod-
ifiable microcircuits (Marder, 2011), as already forecast in the
work of Sherrington and embedded in the ideas of William
James.
In other fields, also, there has been pushback against the idea
that animals other than humans behave without some form of
mindfulness. Affective and incentive motivational processes have
been seen as guiding forces for behavior as potent as stimulus-
response (S-R) associations (Bolles, 1972; Bindra, 1978; Toates,
1986; Berridge, 2004; Salamone and Correa, 2012). Many fea-
tures of behavior have been identified as being driven actively
as intentional processes, rather than by habit (Tolman, 1932;
Holland, 2008). Habits were, accordingly, sometimes separated
from mainstream fields investigating behavior, especially cogni-
tive decision-making behavior. Now, in part due to new methods
emerging to approach this issue more directly, an active field
is exploring what habits might be and what they might not
be (Dickinson, 1985; Graybiel, 1997, 2008; Daw et al., 2005a;
Yin and Knowlton, 2006; Wood and Neal, 2007; Holland, 2008;
Redish et al., 2008; Belin et al., 2009; Packard, 2009; Balleine
and O’Doherty, 2010; Berridge and O’Doherty, 2013; Dolan and
Dayan, 2013).
Here we summarize the results of experiments in which we
asked whether we could, by employing optogenetic methods,
manipulate habitual behaviors—either changing them after they
had formed, or preventing them from being formed. This attempt
at gaining causal evidence about the control of habits suggests that
they are not always stand-alone S-R behaviors, but rather, can be
behaviors that are carefully monitored and controlled by neural
circuits on-line in real time despite their apparent automatic-
ity. We suggest that habits can be characterized as constituting
sequences of actions that have been chunked together through
simultaneous cortical and basal ganglia activity dynamics and as
arising from multiple core operators in the brain that control
habits in real time. Our intent here is to focus on the results
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and implications of newer optogenetic and recording studies,
but we encourage readers to compare and contrast recent arti-
cles for comprehensive views on brain mechanisms related to
learned actions and habits (Graybiel, 2008; Balleine et al., 2009;
Packard, 2009; Balleine and O’Doherty, 2010; Dolan and Dayan,
2013).
OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS AND MEASURES OF HABITUAL
BEHAVIOR
Studies of habitual behaviors use a range of contemporary
empirical approaches to probe their structure in species rang-
ing from flies to rodents to humans (Dickinson, 1985; Yin and
Knowlton, 2006; Brembs, 2009; Tricomi et al., 2009; Balleine
and O’Doherty, 2010). We categorize a few of these approaches
here, and the criteria they set up for definitions of habitual
behavior, but the list that we give is not exhaustive; nor is
each measure exclusive of others. Even within single tasks, key
task demands can push behavior either into more mindful,
goal-directed, flexible modes, or into more habitual, repetitive
or fixed modes (Adams, 1982; Dickinson, 1985; Daw et al.,
2005a; Yin and Knowlton, 2006; Balleine et al., 2009; Packard
and Goodman, 2013). For example, in order to encourage
habits, protocols often include extended and distributed training,
increased reward exposure, diluted contingency between actions
and rewards or increased informational uncertainty, and reduc-
tion in reward contiguity with sensory inputs. The fact that
habitual and cognitively driven behaviors can vary inversely when
task conditions change (or when experimental brain lesions are
imposed) suggests that there is likely to be a competitive or
at least parallel architecture in neural circuits driving habitual
and goal-directed expression of behavior, a point much empha-
sized in current theoretical work (Dickinson, 1985; Balleine and
Dickinson, 1998; Killcross and Coutureau, 2003; Daw et al.,
2005b; Packard and Goodman, 2013) (but also see Dolan and
Dayan, 2013).
OUTCOME REPRESENTATION
In a clever extension of the early logic that S-R and non-S-R
modes of behavior might both exist, revaluation of the reinforce-
ment outcome offered was introduced into an operant task in
order to pit the two behavioral strategies against one another
(Adams, 1982; Dickinson, 1985; Dickinson and Balleine, 2009).
Logic held that if behaviors were driven more by “cognitive”
associations between an action and a particular expected outcome
(goal-driven behavior), then changing the value of the expected
outcome should directly influence the action. Conversely, if a
behavior were like an inflexible S-R reflex lacking outcome rep-
resentation, then outcome changes ought to not affect it.
In an early experiment testing this logic (Adams, 1982), ani-
mals were trained on a simple operant task (e.g., press a lever
for reward). They then received a devaluation of the reward,
which involved induction of conditioning an aversion to the
reward through pairings of the reward with administration of
a nauseogenic agent, lithium chloride. In this paradigm, once
the reinforcement is experienced in its newly devalued state, and
knowledge about the value reduction is acquired, animals are
returned to the task and tested in a probe trial in which no
reinforcement is present—so-called extinction conditions. Ani-
mals that have been trained in the task, but have not been trained
far past their initial acquisition performance levels, reduce their
performance of the action that was paired with obtaining the
newly devalued reward. This finding suggested that the animals
recognize the identity of the outcome that they are working for,
and can flexibly adjust whether they will or will not work to
receive it when its subjective value changes, providing support
for earlier notions of animal purposefulness in behavior (Tolman,
1932; Tolman and Gleitman, 1949; Holland, 2008; Dickinson and
Balleine, 2009). By contrast, animals that have been over-trained
on the task, that is, trained over and over long after they reached
an initial learning criterion, will continue working for it. This
persistence of seeking the reinforcement despite its devaluation
is considered to be a defining mark of habitual behavior.
Over-training is, however, not necessary for such habitual
behavior. Habits can also form in animals without extended
training if they are trained on variable interval task schedules
(rather than on ratio schedules) (Dickinson et al., 1983). In
these variable interval schedules, a reward is given after a varying
length of time, once the initial task behavior is established, in
order to dilute directly the contingency between each action and
each reward experience (Dickinson, 1985; Balleine and Dickinson,
1998). Thus, an additional criterion for defining a behavior
as habitual emerged from this line of work, by which animals
should be insensitive both to outcome value as well as to changes
in the consistency of the action-outcome (A-O) contingency
(Dickinson, 1985; Balleine and Dickinson, 1998).
Among associative learning psychologists, these two instru-
mental learning constructs are contrasted to Pavlovian stimulus-
stimulus (S-S) learning, because this form of learning (as in bell
indicates food) tends to be directly sensitive to reward reval-
uation (Holland and Rescorla, 1975; Balleine and Dickinson,
1992; Dickinson and Balleine, 2009) and generally insensi-
tive to A-O contingencies (Williams and Williams, 1969; Stiers
and Silberberg, 1974; Hershberger, 1986) (see also below for
exceptions).
A large number of loss-of-function neuroscience experiments
supports this framework for interpreting habits as outcome-
insensitive S-R near-reflexes (Figure 1). For example, normally
outcome-insensitive behaviors can be rendered outcome-guided
following disruption (through lesions, chemical inactivation, or
gene knockout) of the sensorimotor striatum (called the dorso-
lateral striatum or DLS). Similar effects are found after disruption
of the dopamine-containing input to the DLS from the pars
compacta of the substantia nigra, after disconnection of the DLS
and the central nucleus of the amygdala (indirectly connected), or
after disruption of pallidum-projecting neurons in the striatum
in general (Yin et al., 2004; Faure et al., 2005; Yu et al., 2009;
Wang et al., 2011; Lingawi and Balleine, 2012). Disruption of the
infralimbic subdivision of medial prefrontal cortex (here called
the infralimbic (IL) cortex) produces similar effects (Coutureau
and Killcross, 2003; Killcross and Coutureau, 2003; Hitchcott
et al., 2007; Smith et al., 2012; Barker et al., 2013). The fact that the
IL cortex is not directly connected with the DLS, along with the
many other regions implicated, suggests a widespread distribution
of habit-promoting regions in the brain.
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic of known habit-related mechanisms using
measures of behavioral outcome-sensitivity. At left, diagram of
loss-of-function results in which habits are suppressed or blocked following
neural interventions. The IL cortex is viewed as necessary for habit
expression due to greater outcome-sensitivity in behavior resulting from
lesions, temporary pharmacologic or optogenetic inhibition, or manipulations
of dopamine-containing input including intra-IL infusion of dopamine, a D1
antagonist, or a D2 agonist (Coutureau and Killcross, 2003; Killcross and
Coutureau, 2003; Hitchcott et al., 2007; Smith et al., 2012; Barker et al., 2013).
The DLS is similarly needed for habit expression, as demonstrated through
lesions, chemical inhibition, molecular signaling inhibition, gene deletion, and
dopaminergic denervation (Yin et al., 2004, 2006; Faure et al., 2005; Yu et al.,
2009; Gourley et al., 2013;). Burst firing of dopaminergic neurons is also
needed, demonstrated by NMDA-R1 receptor knockout (Wang et al., 2011).
Interaction between the CeA and the DLS, through unknown anatomical
routes, is required as well (Lingawi and Balleine, 2012). Although lesions
confound acquisition and expression phases of habits, a role for IL in habit
acquisition specifically has been shown using optogenetics (Smith and
Graybiel, 2013a). At right, diagram and list of some key features of IL and DLS
neural activity related to habit formation and expression as uncovered from
electrical recording and fMRI approaches (Tang et al., 2007; Tricomi et al.,
2009; Thorn et al., 2010; Gremel and Costa, 2013; Smith and Graybiel, 2013a).
Concomitant to these dynamics are a decline in activity in areas that might
oppose habits, including the PL, DMS, and OFC (Thorn et al., 2010; Gremel
and Costa, 2013; Smith and Graybiel, 2013a). IL, infralimbic cortex; DLS,
dorsolateral striatum; VTA, ventral tegmental area; CeA, central nucleus of the
amygdala; PL, prelimbic cortex; DA, dopamine; DMS, dorsomedial striatum;
OFC, orbitofrontal cortex.
MULTIPLE MEMORY SYSTEMS
Related to this line of thinking is the notion that behaviors in
environments requiring navigation (e.g., mazes) can be guided by
spatial cues, or instead can be driven by learned movement plans.
In one famous test, a so-called plus maze was used to tease apart
such “place” (allocentric) and “response” (egocentric) strategies
(Tolman et al., 1947; Packard and McGaugh, 1996). Animals
might start at the south arm and be required to turn east (right)
to receive reward. After a training period, animals then would
be started in the north arm. If they followed the spatial cues, as
trained rats often do, they would turn left to enter the east arm. If,
instead, they had learned to make a particular response, as over-
trained animals might do, they would turn right to enter the west
arm. Habitual behavior, according to this work and its precedents,
was identified by the adoption of such a response-based maze
running strategy. In lesion work, the DLS and dopamine have
once again been implicated as required for such a habitual strategy
(McDonald and White, 1993; Lee et al., 2008; Packard, 2009;
Wang et al., 2011).
LEARNED RESPONSE VS. TREE-SEARCH
Tasks also are often designed to assess the acquisition and per-
sistence of stimulus-evoked responses, such as in having animals
learn to respond in one way to a specific cue in order to receive
a reward and to use various decision-making strategies that are
more or less cognitive or habitual. Recent computational work
has conceived of habits as resulting from model-free learning
systems in the brain (Daw et al., 2005a; McDannald et al., 2012;
Dolan and Dayan, 2013). In this view, behavior is ultimately
brought under the control of two systems—one forward-looking
(model-based), and one that stores value based on experience
(model-free). Model-free control, analogous to habitual behav-
ioral control, is thought to capture a multitude of behavioral
phenomena and corresponding neural findings, the idea being
that behaviors that have been stored through prediction-error
learning might share a common computational structure (Doya
et al., 2002; Daw et al., 2005a; Dolan and Dayan, 2013). This
framework of learning covers traditional instrumental and Pavlo-
vian conditioning realms, in which instances of both model-
free and model-based control is thought to occur (Berridge and
O’Doherty, 2013; Dolan and Dayan, 2013), and has been used
to positive effect in work on brain function in both rodents and
humans (Daw et al., 2005a; Bornstein and Daw, 2011; McDannald
et al., 2012; Dolan and Dayan, 2013). The emerging views are
at a stage of vigorous debate. Lines of evidence have arisen that
support the existence of dissociable biological substrates for each
system, for competition between them, for toggling between them
in single behaviors, for merging them, and even for model-based
systems teaching model-free systems as collaborators (Dolan and
Dayan, 2013). Nonetheless, once again, such work has impli-
cated the striatum, dopamine, and particular circuits in the
neocortex in controlling the acquired model-free behavioral plan
(Daw et al., 2005a; McDannald et al., 2012; Dolan and Dayan,
2013).
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PERFORMANCE OPTIMIZATION
Reminiscent of early thinking is the idea that habits are behav-
iors that have become well-practiced, routine, and predictable.
Useful hallmarks for the formation of skills and habit-like behav-
iors include increased speed to start and complete tasks, more
stereotypic and routed movements through a task environment,
fewer deliberations at decision points, reduced distractibility,
indifference to negative feedback, and increased performance
accuracy (Poldrack et al., 2005; Graybiel, 2008; Belin et al., 2009;
Desrochers et al., 2010; Hikosaka and Isoda, 2010; Smith and
Graybiel, 2013a). Such measures do not distinguish the possible
covert strategies or task representations that might be controlling
behavior; but they do provide an important set of reference points
for understanding a behavior as more or less exploratory and
might serve as reference points for understanding the progres-
sion of habit formation and the involvement of potential brain
mechanisms.
NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL CORRELATES OF HABITUAL ACTION
LEARNING
We turn now to insights gained from exploiting relatively recent
technological advances, including chronic recording from behav-
ing animals and gene-based targeting strategies for manipulating
brain activity in real time by optogenetics. Loss-of-function stud-
ies, such as those highlighted above, provided strong evidence for
regions of the neocortex and basal ganglia as being critical for
the expression of habits. It is possible at some level to map these
roles onto changes in neural activity recorded from these regions.
However, they have not yet converged on a unified view of the
underlying structure of a habitual behavior. This difference is the
main focus of our discussion.
Numerous changes in neuronal activity in the neocortex and
basal ganglia have been documented in rodents and primates as
learned behaviors shift with practice from exploratory to skillful
in their execution. Ensembles of neurons develop time-locked
responses to well learned or innate sequences of actions such
as grooming patterns or sequences of motifs in birdsong, often
with distinct representations of distinct steps within a sequence
(Berns and Sejnowski, 1998; Brainard and Doupe, 2002; Fujii
and Graybiel, 2003, 2005; Aldridge et al., 2004; Jin et al., 2009;
Hikosaka and Isoda, 2010; Fee and Goldberg, 2011). Related
work in rats has focused on the plasticity of somatotopic repre-
sentations in the striatum during motor learning. For example,
by recording the activity of forelimb-sensitive neurons in rats
performing a forelimb reaching task, Carelli and West found that
as the movements were repeated over time for reward, there was
a decline in the response of movement-related neurons (Carelli
et al., 1997; Tang et al., 2007). This result points to a contrast
with the findings in cortical recording experiments on related
tasks (Karni et al., 1995; Nudo et al., 1996; Plautz et al., 2000);
instead of increasing the representation of movements as they
are put to use in a task, the striatum appears to become more
selective or efficient in such representations. This work raised the
important possibility that regions needed for habit expression
are themselves key sites of neuroplasticity. The way in which
these plasticity changes reshape neural ensemble activity has been
surprising.
AS THE DORSOLATERAL STRIATUM (DLS) SEES HABITS: ACTION
CHUNKING REPRESENTATIONS
We have explored this plasticity in striatal activity in the DLS
region targeted in the loss of function studies, by recording for the
entire time during which rats and mice develop habitual behaviors
with extensive training on T-maze tasks (in which reward is
obtained following correct navigation in response to instruction
cues) (Figure 1). The findings in these studies have provided
evidence for viewing habits fundamentally as sequence of actions
that are grouped together, or “chunked”, for ready deployment.
By recording simultaneously from many putative medium-spiny
neurons (MSNs) in the DLS day by day, we asked what neural
activity might occur during task training and over-training.
An initial study (Jog et al., 1999) documented a remarkable
change in patterning of spike activity in the DLS viewed in the
framework of entire run-times. In the relatively naïve animals,
DLS ensembles were active during the runs, but as training
continued and the runs became well-practiced and faster, many
individual units in the DLS ensembles developed activity that was
particularly pronounced at the beginning and/or at the end of
the runs, and fewer were active mid-run. This beginning-and-end
task-bracketing activity provided a compelling candidate neural
correlate for the chunking of actions together into a habitual
unit (Graybiel, 1998). It has long been noted that individual
elements of memories can be chunked together to aid recall
(Miller, 1956)—as we recall PIN numbers, passcodes, and phone
numbers. It is difficult to remember the elements other than
within the whole, as witnessed by the trouble we have in picking
up in the middle after interruptions in recall. In the context of
actions, plausibly, a well learned action-sequence could similarly
be chunked into a performance unit. The recorded DLS activity
certainly appeared to reflect this process and suggested indeed
that a habit might in part be a chunked-together sequence of
behavioral steps.
It soon became clear that not only the numbers of neurons,
but also the spike rates of the neurons, contributed to the task-
bracketing patterns (Barnes et al., 2005). Moreover, the chunking
pattern grew as the animals learned the habit, but changed if
conditions changed during extinction and reinstatement tests
(Barnes et al., 2005). When the rewards presented at the goal
sites during the training phase were then removed or greatly
reduced, the DLS bracketing pattern returned to roughly the same
pan-run pattern present in the untrained animals, and when the
rewards were suddenly returned, the bracketing pattern returned
in nearly its fully developed form. Was the neural activity pattern
suppressed? Passed to another brain region? Too small to detect
with extracellular ensemble recording methods? These are very
live issues that need answers. What these dynamics do suggest
is that just as habits, once developed, are difficult to forget,
so the patterned neural activity that accompanies them can be
suppressed but still is maintained so that it can be expressed
rapidly when conditions call for it (Pavlov, 1927; Rescorla, 1996;
Barnes et al., 2005). The DLS dynamics appear to play a key role
in this rapid loss and recovery of learned habits.
This bracketing pattern has since been found in other regions
as well. It emerges as part of the neural representation of song
repetition in HVC of Bengalese finches (Fujimoto et al., 2011),
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in primate prefrontal cortex as a series of saccades are performed
by highly trained monkeys (Fujii and Graybiel, 2003), and in the
substantia nigra of mice as they learn to press a lever repeatedly for
reward (Jin and Costa, 2010). The DLS “end-related activity” can
phasically precede or follow the end of a performance sequence, or
appear as phasic activity around finalizing actions, such as turning
in the T-maze task, depending on task-type or potentially the
trial-to-trial time-locking of repeated actions for analysis (Barnes
et al., 2005; Kubota et al., 2009; Jin and Costa, 2010; Thorn et al.,
2010; Smith and Graybiel, 2013a).
Within the DLS, the chunking pattern is not restricted to the
MSNs, but can be expressed by interneurons as well, but with
interesting differences. Kubota et al. (2009) trained and then over-
trained mice in the standard maze T-maze task in which turn
directions were instructed by auditory cues, and then without
warning switched the modality of the instruction cues from
auditory to tactile. Remarkably, in MSNs, the chunking pattern
was unaffected by this task change and accompanying drop in
performance accuracy; it continued to emphasize the beginning
and end of maze runs despite the cue shift and the resulting robust
shift in performance. Fast-firing neurons, putative striatal fast-
spiking interneurons (FSIs), recorded simultaneously with MSNs,
also developed the task-bracketing activity pattern. But the activ-
ity of these FSIs did change when the sudden task modification
was introduced; they developed a phasic response at the onset
of the new cue, a response that then faded with several days of
further training.
These distinct MSN and FSI dynamics could be important
for the striatum to maintain an overall structure of the task—
a general plan or action set—while still processing changes in
task details to adjust performance (Kubota et al., 2009). In other
studies, the activity of striatal FSI populations has also been
shown to relate to the suppression of unwanted or unselected
movements (Wickens et al., 2007; Berke, 2011), suggesting that
one important role of their sudden engagement at the T-maze cue
shift could be to suppress pre-potent responses to the initial cue.
They could effectively halt or segment the chunked behavior to
permit flexibility in incorporating the new cue-response segment
into a newly chunked behavioral pattern. Another important class
of striatal interneurons, the cholinergic cells or tonically active
neurons (TANs), show even further distinction in their dynamics
related to task performance (Aosaki et al., 1994; Kimura et al.,
2003; Apicella, 2007; Graybiel, 2008; Goldberg and Reynolds,
2011; Thorn and Graybiel, in press). The question of how
interactions among these subtypes of striatal neurons relates
to DLS function can now be addressed with cell-type specific
markers.
DORSOMEDIAL STRIATUM (DMS) PLASTICITY TRACKS HABIT
FORMATION ALONGSIDE DORSOLATERAL STRIATUM (DLS) STABILITY
From the point of view of the field focusing on habit learning,
a key issue for these T-maze experiments was the relation of the
DLS task-bracketing pattern to activity in other striatal regions,
particularly in the dorsomedial striatum (DMS). Inhibition of
the DMS leads to a loss of behavioral flexibility and outcome-
sensitivity, and an increase in habitual mode of responding, in
multiple task conditions (Yin et al., 2005b; Ragozzino, 2007;
Packard, 2009). These results were opposite to the results of
inhibiting the DLS, suggesting that the two regions have opposing
functions in relation to balancing flexible and inflexible behavior.
If the DLS chunking pattern found in the T-maze experiments
were related to habits, as suspected, then DMS activity recorded in
parallel ought to be quite different, related to cognitive-associative
components of the task rather than to habitual performance.
This prediction turned out to have support from the exper-
iments of Thorn et al. (2010), who recorded simultaneously in
both the DLS and the DMS while rats were trained on audi-
tory and tactile versions of the T-maze task. The DLS formed
its task-bracketing ensemble activity pattern early and main-
tained it as the animals proceeded through the extensive train-
ing protocol. Simultaneously, DMS ensemble activity during the
decision time in the task increased as animals were learning—
the time of lessened activity in the DLS. Then, as the animals
became familiar with the task during over-training, this DMS
decision-period activity waned. Thus a different set of dynamics
marked habit learning in the two striatal regions. The DMS
region in which these recordings were made was at about the
same anteroposterior level as that of the DLS recordings, and
so was anterior to the region studied in the loss of function
studies (Yin et al., 2005a,b; Bradfield et al., 2013). A shift in
the balance of DMS and DLS activity is emerging as a com-
mon marker of acquired habits in neural recording studies. For
example, a recent experiment (Gremel and Costa, 2013) adapted
a context-dependent habit task (Killcross and Coutureau, 2003)
in which rats would behave habitually in one environment (in
this case, where reward was delivered on a random interval
schedule) but non-habitually in another environment (where
reward was delivered on a random ratio schedule). Switching
between habitual and non-habitual performance states in these
environments was accompanied by a shift, in presumably the
same neurons, between higher overall firing activity in DLS vs.
DMS, respectively. Similarly, strengthening of DLS activity with
decline of DMS activity has also been found in mice under-
going training on a rotarod task (Yin et al., 2009), suggest-
ing this shifted medial-lateral balance in striatal activity also
extends to skilled behaviors that were acquired through negative
reinforcement.
The contrast in DLS and DMS neural dynamics suggests that,
in a reinforcement context, changes in DMS activity might direct
the expression of behaviors as they are being formed into habits,
but once the DMS activity falls, then DLS-related circuits might
take over the control of the behaviors, allowing them to be
expressed as habit (Thorn et al., 2010). This notion meshes well
with models derived from the results of lesion work, in which
the rapid establishment of a habit following DMS (or prelimbic
cortex) lesions is considered to reflect the uncovering of a DLS-
associated habit that was dormant or occluded when the goal-
directed system was intact (Killcross and Coutureau, 2003; Daw
et al., 2005a; Yin and Knowlton, 2006; Balleine et al., 2009). In
new work (Thorn and Graybiel, in press), evidence is emerging
that theta-band oscillatory activity might allow the DMS and DLS
to have different information flow through channels favoring sub-
bands of theta. Moreover, in the T-maze task, which involves
elements of both place and response learning, oscillatory local
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field potential activities in the striatum and hippocampus become
progressively linked by the development of inverse phase relation-
ships in the theta-band oscillations that they exhibit, especially
during the decision-making parts of the runs (DeCoteau et al.,
2007a,b; Tort et al., 2008).
If, as these studies suggest, there is parallel operation and
possibly competition between circuits engaged by these striatal
sub-regions in controlling behavior, then the brain might have
a selection or arbitration mechanism for guiding the switch
between them (Killcross and Coutureau, 2003; Daw et al., 2005a;
Yin and Knowlton, 2006; Dolan and Dayan, 2013). The T-maze
work suggested that the dynamics of the DMS activity might
accomplish this function (Thorn et al., 2010), but left unre-
solved was which of the many DMS inputs might be driving
the change, as well as the potential existence of similar habit-
related neural dynamics in other brain regions. One potential
route toward increasing or decreasing habit strength could be
to enhance experimentally the decision-related DMS activity.
However, the increase in strength of the bracketing pattern seen
in some of these studies (Barnes et al., 2005) together with the
increase in overall DLS activity that appears to occur as skills
emerge in other studies (Tricomi et al., 2009; Yin et al., 2009;
Gremel and Costa, 2013) raises the possibility that some task
environments or types of learning might recruit late-stage plas-
ticity in both DMS and DLS. As we discuss below, our evidence
suggests that DLS is participating actively in action sequence
expression and run-to-run automaticity of behavior at all stages,
and is not only keeping the task-bracketing pattern ready for
selection according to changes in the activity of other brain
regions.
DORSOLATERAL STRIATUM (DLS) ENCODES ACTION SEQUENCES AND
AUTOMATICITY DURING AN OUTCOME-INSENSITIVE HABIT
Loss-of-function studies rooted in associative learning theory
have largely been done separately from studies of the neural
plasticity related to the formation of rewarded action sequences,
but important attempts are being made to bridge the two research
strategies (Tang et al., 2007; Kimchi et al., 2009; Stalnaker et al.,
2010; Fanelli et al., 2013; Gremel and Costa, 2013; Smith and
Graybiel, 2013a). In the T-maze, for instance, major questions
remained about whether changes in neural activity, particularly
in the DLS, related to habit formation as formally defined in
outcome representation terms. Did maze performance reflect an
A-O or place-based strategy, or an S-R or response-based strategy?
Were dynamics of the DLS task-bracketing pattern related in any
way to shifts between these strategies? How would S-R learning be
reflected in the DLS dynamics?
To address some of these questions, we developed a modified
version of the T-maze task in which a distinct reward was to be
found at each of the two end-arms of the maze, and the reward-
specific devaluation-sensitivity test was used to assay habitual
behavior. Throughout this time, single-unit activity was recorded
in both the DLS and its counterpart in the IL cortex, two canonical
habit-promoting regions.
In the DLS, we observed the familiar task-bracketing pattern,
with the firing of MSNs accentuating the run start, turn, and goal
arrival. This pattern formed rapidly, around the time that animals
reached a criterion of accuracy on the task. Importantly, however,
parallel experiments in a set of control animals established that
behavior was markedly goal directed at this early training point. In
the probe test given on the day after devaluation, animals trained
just to the learning criterion would immediately avoid the deval-
ued goal (Smith et al., 2012). Thus, the DLS chunking pattern
was emerging prior to habit expression proper. Once it formed,
the DLS pattern remained steady during the over-training period,
and, judging from the probe test given after the over-training
period, the animals formed a devaluation-insensitive habit. After
the probe test, when rewards for correct runs were returned, the
animals’ behavior changed sharply; runs slowed, deliberative head
movements increased, and accuracy dropped. However, as in the
cue modality switch study discussed above (Kubota et al., 2009),
the DLS pattern remained nearly unchanged. The DLS activity
at the start, turn, and end of the runs remained as strong as it
had been before. Behaviorally, animals were running correctly
to the devalued goal (fewer trials) or to the non-devalued goal,
or running the “wrong way” to the non-devalued goal when
instructed to the devalued goal. At the session-wide level, it
appeared that as long as animals were running a familiar route
smoothly, whether the run was rewarded or not, the DLS ensem-
ble pattern persisted. This possibility was supported further when
we devalued all goals, which led to extinction of maze runs and
a corresponding rapid loss of the chunking pattern (Smith and
Graybiel, 2013a).
In trial-by-trial analyses of the DLS ensemble activity, and
also in analyses of the activity of other subpopulations of DLS
neurons, we did not find any clear relationship between the
action-encoding in the DLS in any given trial and the timing of
habit formation and suppression. DLS activity similarly lacked
any correlation with sensitivity or insensitivity to outcome value
on single runs. What we did find, however, was a remarkably
close DLS relationship to the automaticity of a given run. During
some runs, particularly early in training, animals would delib-
erate at the junction of the goal-arms, essentially conducting a
“vicarious trial and error” by using their head to check each
one before making a choice (Muenzinger, 1938; Tolman, 1948;
Johnson and Redish, 2007). Both the strength of the DLS activity
at the start of the run and the strength of the overall DLS
chunking pattern were correlated inversely with these delibera-
tive head movements: the DLS pattern was much stronger on
trials that lacked this deliberation. This finding suggested that
the DLS keeps track of or controls the level of automaticity
or decisiveness of behavior at points of choice options. Much
like the increased efficiency of movement-related signals that
occurs in the DLS as actions are learned (Carelli et al., 1997;
Jog et al., 1999; Graybiel, 2008), an increase in performance
optimization appeared to characterize the buildup of DLS activity
around major task actions. However, a particularly intriguing
aspect of the results is that the major correlate of deliberative
head movements occurred in DLS activity at the start of the run,
and not in DLS activity at the turn itself when the deliberations
were occurring or not (Smith and Graybiel, 2013a). Thus the
activity was not related to the head movements themselves, but
was anticipatory or predictive. This correlation of DLS activity
with non-deliberative running was evident in early training as
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well as in late over-training, indicating a close involvement of
the DLS run-to-run, more than just at the phase of behavioral
learning when the behavior was expressed as a habit. In short,
although the DLS pattern could mark the early formation of a
habitual response plan (and “memory” of this plan after deval-
uation), it appears to relate quite closely to behavior on a trial-
to-trial basis, even in demonstrably goal-directed performance
phases.
IMPLICATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING HABITS: VIEWING
DORSOLATERAL STRIATUM (DLS) ACTIVITY AS A STARTING
POINT RATHER THAN A FINISHING LINE
A PUZZLING DISCONNECT BETWEEN DORSOLATERAL STRIATUM (DLS)
PHYSIOLOGY AND STIMULUS-RESPONSE (S-R) BEHAVIORAL THEORY
Some of these DLS dynamics seem surprising in the context of
reinforcement learning models. As noted, there is a long tradition
of referring to chained S-R associations as the underlying base
of habitual behavior, and developments in learning theory have
pinpointed conditions under which behavior might be under-
stood as an S-R habit as opposed to an A-O behavior or Pavlovian
conditioned response (Dickinson, 1985; Balleine and Dickinson,
1998; Daw et al., 2005a; Yin and Knowlton, 2006; Holland, 2008;
Schneck and Vezina, 2012). The DLS is widely regarded as a
source, if not the source, for such associations in the brain. Yet
fitting aspects of the neural recording data within this framework
is not straightforward. Concerning our maze task alone, we have
highlighted the many dynamic processes that exist in DLS phys-
iology, including those of different types of task-related patterns,
different task epochs, and different neuronal types. Notable for
this discussion is the finding that the DLS pattern forms prior
to habit emergence, correlates with how automatic a run is from
early on, and remains stable after devaluation despite major
accompanying changes in behavior and valuation of stimuli,
responses, and outcomes. Moreover, we, as our colleagues, find
relatively few neurons in the DLS that have preferential responses
to S-R combinations (Berke et al., 2009; Thorn et al., 2010; Smith
and Graybiel, 2013a). One complex way that these findings might
be reconciled with an S-R view is if behavior were partly habitual
from the moment of DLS pattern formation (which it might be),
and if that particular habit memory were stored stably and used
selectively during over-training but not used during most runs
after reward devaluation.
Contrasts have also arisen in related work showing that as
a devaluation-insensitive habit develops, there is a loss of spe-
cific head-movement-related activity in DLS neurons in a head-
bobbing task (Tang et al., 2009). However, a similar weakening of
neural activity of tongue-related units in lateral striatum occurs
with training on a licking task, but this licking behavior remains
devaluation-sensitive (Tang et al., 2009). In another study, action-
related neural responses that are modulated by the identity of a
preceding cue arise in the DLS (Stalnaker et al., 2010). Although
this result would appear to offer evidence for an S-R associ-
ation, the same correlates arise simultaneously in the DMS, a
“non-habit” site. The authors speculate that S-R integration was
occurring elsewhere, perhaps in sites receiving DLS outputs. All
of these incongruities might be good indicators that we should
look elsewhere than in the DLS or its outputs for habit-related
activity. However, if the neural dynamics that dominate DLS
recordings in these studies are considered to reflect important
features of ongoing behavior, as they certainly appear to, different
conclusions arise. One is that stimulus-specific response plans
might be supported more widely in the striatum than we thought.
Another is that the increased efficiency of performance-related
representations in DLS activity might aid behavior in a wide
variety of Pavlovian, goal-directed, and habitual tasks. And as is
so often true, the specific demands of tasks shape the patterns of
activity found.
Returning to the T-maze, the findings that we review suggest
that the DLS can contribute to habits in a way that does not
encode a chain of task-related S-R associations, a possibility that
has at least some support in the literature. Although S-R associa-
tions need not take any particular form in neural activity, the lack
of stimulus-evoked firing in the DLS has raised the question of
how habits are represented in this region if not by responses to
paired Ss and Rs (difficult-to-isolate contextual S’s notwithstand-
ing) (Berke et al., 2009; Root et al., 2010; Thorn et al., 2010; Smith
and Graybiel, 2013a). Similarly, although abolishing dopamine
input to the DLS leads some behaviors to be devaluation-sensitive
(i.e., not “habitual”) (Faure et al., 2005), a task designed to tap
into S-R learning strategies can be performed mostly normally
in Parkinsonian patients with similar dopaminergic dysfunction,
suggesting to the authors an independence of S-R learning from
the DLS (de Wit et al., 2011). From the brain’s point of view,
the neural dynamics that do occur during habit formation might
provide some insight into the role of DLS in mediating behavior,
even if it does not lead precisely to the same S-R notions that
inspired the research.
DORSOLATERAL STRIATUM (DLS) ACTION CHUNKING AS HABIT
FORMATION
The dominant pattern that emerges in the DLS during habit
formation, at least on the maze, is the accentuation of salient
actions or behavioral boundaries and has a close relationship to
run automaticity. If we take this pattern as a starting point, action
chunking seems like a plausible underlying DLS mechanism for
controlling habits (Graybiel, 1998). In this way, sequences of
actions can become linked and can be executed as a unit auto-
matically or semi-automatically. To the extent that associations
are driving the chunking process, the links that are made between
each action could provide a means for dissociating behavior from
the outcome.
The chunking together of the actions and accentuation of
start-related activity can be viewed as enhancing the performance
of the bounded sequence of actions, once the sequence is ini-
tiated. This is an important property, one that could permit
actions even close to reward to be conducted in the context of
the chunked-together unit. There is much evidence that under
normal conditions, actions and cues that are proximal to reward
are more closely associated with its specific features, and thus
are more sensitive to shifts in its value or contingency. Actions
or cues occurring more distally to reward might carry a more
diluted reward representation arising from additional associa-
tions made with subsequent actions and cues, yielding more
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outcome-independence. This touches on the problem of credit
assignment in reinforcement learning theory (Sutton and Barto,
1998). Empirically, although reward-distal cues appear to make
good predictors of impending reward, they are less sensitive to
shifts in motivational state or outcome value compared to reward-
proximal cues (Tindell et al., 2005; Zhang et al., 2009; Smith et al.,
2011). Conditioned behavioral responses to cues, instrumental
actions, and species-specific behaviors (e.g., predation in the
cat) show a similar sensitivity to state or reward value changes
based on proximity to actual reward receipt (Morgan, 1974;
Holland and Straub, 1979; Balleine et al., 1995; Holland et al.,
2008).
This phenomenon seems to bear out in the maze as well. When
we devalued all rewards on our maze after the initial devaluation,
the DLS pattern was rapidly lost. The rats showed a progressive
backward breakdown effect (Morgan, 1974), first failing to drink
the reward and then failing to turn upon instruction, and yet
persisting in the initial run initiation (Smith and Graybiel, 2013a).
This result raises the possibility that the maze running actions,
once released from being expressed as a chunk, could show similar
variations in flexibility based on their proximity to reward. By
extension, when previously chunked as a sequence, the full run
behaved like the most reward-distal action (i.e., run start). This
proposal meshes quite well with the finding that devaluation of a
well-learned action sequence can lead to the loss of the sequence
in full, as opposed to the loss of only the reward-proximal element
(Ostlund et al., 2009). Similarly, monkeys trained to press buttons
sequentially in order to obtain reward will continue to conduct
the full sequence even if the reward is made available to them
earlier, an effect that appears to relate to the strength of striatal
dopamine input (Matsumoto et al., 1999). Similar continuation
of reward-seeking acts despite disinterest in the reward itself has
been noted in a variety of older behavioral studies (see Mor-
gan, 1974). This general phenomenon calls to mind the famous
“kerplunk” effect (Carr and Watson, 1908), in which animals
are trained well on a complex maze and then an experimenter
suddenly moves the reward (and end-wall) to a closer position.
Well-trained animals continue running right past the reward and
contact the wall, as though they had formed a habit of a certain
response set that would be carried out in full even if it resulted
poorly.
We raise the possibility that part of this action-chunking and
outcome-decoupling process might involve a motivational value
that is bound to the chunked action sequence itself. Cues, for
instance, can grow to acquire incentive value specific to the reward
with which they are paired; the cues then become attractive
and meaningful, and can pull in behavior (Bolles, 1972; Bindra,
1978; Toates, 1986; Berridge, 2004; Rudebeck and Murray, 2011).
Something similar might occur with strongly reinforcement, by
which doing them becomes attractive and rewarding in its own
right (Berridge, 2009). Glickman and Schiff (1967) suggested
that some actions, such as those related to food consumption
or copulation, have had value attached to them over the course
of evaluation. DLS activity might be one candidate substrate for
this value-binding process. Such a view might help to account for
several observations: the strong accentuation of reinforced actions
by DLS activity in the T-maze task; the fact that this activity
pattern was maintained after devaluation of one reward (i.e.,
when animals mostly ran to the non-devalued goal regardless of
instruction, as though it were an immediately valued route); and
the fact that the activity pattern was lost after all outcomes were
devalued and behavior was extinguished (when values decay).
Actions attaining incentive value could in principle drive behavior
independently from expected outcome value, and thus function
much differently than the “action value” signals of reinforcement
learning and behavioral economics (Rangel et al., 2008).
This action-bound value conceptualization of chunked behav-
iors might ultimately also help link together disparate functions
of the DLS, including its contribution to behaviors that are not
easily interpreted in the context of prediction-error learning, such
as instinctive grooming patterns and Pavlovian-to-instrumental
transfer (Aldridge et al., 2004; Corbit and Janak, 2007). Why
is there an impetus to perform such actions? There are many
possible reasons, but one could be that the behaviors have an
intrinsic incentive motivational value, whether innately expressed
or acquired through experience. More broadly, too much or
too little value might contribute to excessive drive to perform
actions (as in obsessive-compulsive spectrum disorders) or loss
of the capacity to perform intended actions (e.g., in Parkinson’s
disease).
Many of the relationships between DLS activity and habitual
behavior that we have emphasized are at the level of correla-
tions. Similarly, the lack of detection of robust S-R or other
representations in the DLS is not evidence that they are not
present; chunking-related activity is a dominant DLS signal, but
S-R encoding could well be found in other tasks, in other brain
regions, or in other features of DLS physiology. Even how the task-
bracketing pattern relates to the motor demands of the behavior
has not been fully documented. We especially emphasize that in
the DLS, the relatively low activity in-between the pronounced
beginning and end of the runs does not mean a lack of activity
at these times. Further “expert neurons”, with highly specialized
functions, remain active even during mid-run when ensemble
activity quiets (Barnes et al., 2005; Thorn et al., 2010).This pattern
suggests that sparse coding, a feature of many neural systems,
could be built into the DLS activity, reflecting the capacity for
a few neurons to encode the full sequence, and/or that after a
behavioral sequence has become habitual, it is advantageous to
free up neurons to participate in other computations. Finally, as
originally discovered by Barnes et al. (2005), the chunking pattern
is shown by a large population of DLS projection neurons, but
many other neurons become quieted throughout the runs as the
maze training proceeds. It is still not clear whether the quieted
neurons form a special class, for example, the so-called indirect
pathway neurons as opposed to direct, as discussed by Thorn
et al. (2010). If so, this distinction would parallel the superficial
layer-deep layer dichotomy in the bracketing pattern observed
in the IL cortex (Smith and Graybiel, 2013a). Clearly further
research is needed to characterize the control mechanisms of
action chunking in the striatum and elsewhere (Graybiel, 2008;
Desmurget and Turner, 2010; Dezfouli and Balleine, 2012). Thus
far, however, evidence is compelling: (1) that habits are, in part,
chunked action sequences; (2) that this function is reflected, in
part, in dynamic patterns of activity in the DLS and DMS; and
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(3) that action sequence chunking, as reflected by this activity
patterning, is a main, but not sole, contribution of the DLS to
habits.
DUAL OPERATORS FOR HABITS: CONTRASTING DYNAMICS
IN THE INFRALIMBIC CORTEX (IL) AND DORSOLATERAL
STRIATUM (DLS)
The prefrontal cortical region known as IL cortex has been
identified as having habit-promoting functions similar to those of
the DLS, despite its apparent lack of direct connections with the
DLS (Figure 1). Lesions or inactivation of the IL cortex result in
outcome-sensitivity and habit blockade (Coutureau and Killcross,
2003; Killcross and Coutureau, 2003). However, there are specific
details of the tasks employed in these studies that are important
to consider. Normally, animals trained to the point of exhibiting
habitual behavior on a lever press task will continue pressing both
a lever paired with a reward that has been devalued and a lever
paired with a non-devalued reward. Lesions or GABAergic inhi-
bition of the IL cortex lead animals to press more than normally
on the lever for the non-devalued reward, but the animals do not
increase pressing on the lever for the devalued reward (Coutureau
and Killcross, 2003; Killcross and Coutureau, 2003). These results
provided evidence of a more goal-directed form of behavior that
would otherwise be habitual were the IL cortex intact. Intra-IL
microinjection of dopamine similarly leads to increased pressing
on a lever for a non-devalued reward, but it also concomitantly
reduces pressing on a lever for a devalued reward (Hitchcott
et al., 2007). Collectively, these findings identify the IL cortex as a
prefrontal region that is important for maintaining an outcome-
insensitive habit. The distinct result of increased behavior to a
valued goal following IL disruption has led to the suggestion
that the IL cortex (by way of being affected by dopamine levels)
might control changes in the allocation of both goal-directed and
habitual strategies when outcome value changes (Hitchcott et al.,
2007; Dolan and Dayan, 2013).
To evaluate the extent to which habit formation might be
reflected similarly in the firing patterns of the IL cortex and the
DLS, we recorded in these regions simultaneously as we trained
series of rats in the two-reward maze paradigm (Smith and
Graybiel, 2013a). We found that the bracketing pattern developed
in the IL cortex as well as in the DLS, but that its formation was
delayed until well into the over-training period. This finding, and
the differential sensitivity of the IL cortex and DLS patterns to
reward devaluation, raised the possibility that the IL cortex and
the DLS function as distinct core contributors, or operators, in
the development of habits. In this view, habits are promoted by
at least two underlying controllers in the brain. The dynamics we
recorded suggested a mixed redundancy and distinctiveness of the
activities in the two regions, and provided information about the
circuit-level patterning of neural activity that occurs as habits are
made.
The similar action-bracketing activity in the IL cortex and DLS
suggested the existence of at least one common neural signature
of habit formation shared by IL-associated prefrontal and DLS-
associated neural circuits. The IL pattern was slightly different in
terms of makeup, being more broadly activated just prior to run
initiation and prior to goal arrival, but in the DLS, as in the IL
cortex, activity during the decision period was greatly diminished.
The timing of the changes in activity patterns in the two regions
was strikingly different. IL activity scarcely changed until the late
over-training period, when our behavioral devaluation measures
had shown was the time that the maze habit became crystal-
lized, shifting from being devaluation-sensitive to devaluation-
insensitive. At this time, the IL task-bracketing pattern formed
and persisted until reward devaluation. Although the IL pattern
was present during the probe test, at which time behavior was
expressed as habitual, it rapidly decayed when the rewards were
returned in post-probe training sessions and running choices
changed. Later, after a prolonged period of continued post-probe
training, the IL pattern returned. This period of further plasticity
in IL activity corresponded to a stage at which a second, replace-
ment habit probably had formed on the maze, given the behavior
of the rats: initially after devaluation, they began to avoid the
devalued goal and, instead, began to run to the non-devalued side.
These wrong-way runs increased in frequency over days (despite
lack of reward for them), became faster and increasingly similar to
the instructed runs to the same location, and lost the deliberative
head movements at the turn that had appeared earlier. Thus, the
return of the IL task-bracketing pattern appeared to mark the
formation of a new habit of simply running to the non-devalued
goal. We suggest as a leading possibility that the alignment of the
more flexible IL chunking pattern of activity to the more rigid
chunking pattern expressed in the DLS might be necessary for
expressing behavior as a habit.
Unlike the ensemble activity in the DLS, the IL activity pattern
could not be linked consistently to any run-to-run variation of
behavior that we assessed. This negative finding was surprising,
as it seemed to suggest that the IL cortex was not functioning in
our task as an arbiter or habit-selector as had been speculated. If
the IL cortex had such a function, its activity ought to reflect, on a
given trial, whether behavior was outcome-sensitive or outcome-
insensitive, deliberative or non-deliberative. This form of coding
has been observed in other cortical regions (Wunderlich et al.,
2012), and is essential for allowing a rapid toggling between more
goal-directed and habitual strategies in some ongoing behaviors
(Dolan and Dayan, 2013). We also might have expected an
outcome value-tracking signal if the IL cortex were, at some
level, aiding in goal-directed behavior as prior work suggested
(Hitchcott et al., 2007). What we found, instead, was that the
IL task-bracketing activity was inversely correlated with the net
number of deliberations and level of outcome sensitivity that
occurred in entire sessions, each composed of many individual
maze runs. The contribution of IL cortex to the maze running
habit might therefore be at the level of a state property (Smith
and Graybiel, 2013a). Much as the state of stress can lead to either
cribbing or pacing in horses, here the state contributed by IL
activity could promote habits without specifying their behavioral
details.
The task-bracketing ensemble activity that we observed in
the IL cortex was mostly restricted to neurons located in the
superficial layers of the IL cortex. Neurons recorded from deeper
layers exhibited plasticity in firing rate at nearly identical time
points, but during runs, the deep layer ensembles became active
throughout the run. Thus, there was striking layer-selectivity to
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the habit-related activity patterns. An interesting possibility is
that the chunking pattern in IL cortex is indicative of activity
that is communicated across trans-cortical networks; but we lack
enough information to test this possibility. We do point out that
the bracketing pattern was not general to the prefrontal cortex.
Ensemble activity recorded from the overlying prelimbic cortex
declined as the habit emerged, consistent with its DMS-like role
in promoting behavioral flexibility (Balleine and Dickinson, 1998;
Killcross and Coutureau, 2003).
These findings suggested a far more central role for the IL
cortex in habit acquisition and expression than formerly appre-
ciated. By some views, the IL cortex was thought to serve as
an arbitration or contention-scheduling mechanism for selecting
goal-directed vs. habit strategies (Coutureau and Killcross, 2003;
Daw et al., 2005a), or to promote habits by acting on learned
associations stored elsewhere (Balleine and Killcross, 2006). The
dense connectivity that the IL cortex shares with limbic and
associative regions, including the amygdala and ventral striatum
(Hurley et al., 1991; Vertes, 2004), suggests that IL activation
feeds forward to dampen evaluative processes in these sites or
to invigorate motivation or prior learned associations in order to
promote behavioral persistence. The development or decrease of
IL activity—possibly specifically of its task-bracketing activity—
might ultimately provide a permissive state for habits.
Much like the weakening of DMS activity that we have seen
during over-training on the maze (Thorn et al., 2010), the timing
of IL plasticity could similarly be critical for habits—when the
task-bracketing pattern is expressed alongside the similar ensem-
ble pattern in the DLS, behaviors grow outcome-insensitive.
Ultimately, the stages of plasticity in the IL cortex, in the DMS
and in their associated circuitries might thus determine or allow
the full strength of a habit to be expressed, the essential involve-
ment of DLS in action sequencing or valuation notwithstanding
(Killcross and Coutureau, 2003; Yin and Knowlton, 2006; Balleine
et al., 2009; Thorn et al., 2010; Smith and Graybiel, 2013a).
Research from several laboratories has begun to identify the
neurochemical/molecular signals within IL cortex that might aid
this privileged function, including transmission involving GABA
and dopamine (Coutureau and Killcross, 2003; Hitchcott et al.,
2007; Barker et al., 2013).
The neural dynamics and behavioral correlations uncovered
in the T-maze study suggest an intimate participation by the IL
cortex in sculpting and maintaining habits in addition to a role in
selecting them (Hitchcott et al., 2007; Smith and Graybiel, 2013a).
If so, it should be possible to test, by means of optogenetic inter-
ventions, the view that the IL cortex contributes core components
to a habit, just as does the DLS. We have done such testing in two
ways.
OPTOGENETIC INTERVENTIONS TO TEST THE IMPACT OF
REAL-TIME ACTIVITY DYNAMICS IN THE INFRALIMBIC
CORTEX (IL)
ROLES OF THE INFRALIMBIC CORTEX (IL) IN HABIT EXPRESSION
To evaluate a causal contribution of ongoing, real-time activity
in the IL cortex to habitual behavior, we incorporated an optoge-
netic approach (Smith and Graybiel, 2013b). The spatiotemporal
resolution provided by optogenetics, now widely noted (Boyden
et al., 2005; Bernstein and Boyden, 2011; Fenno et al., 2011; Mei
and Zhang, 2012), allowed us to restrict IL disruption to partic-
ular time windows of specific populations of neurons. We sought
to perturb IL activity only during the maze runs, not before or
after the runs, in order to evaluate on-line functions of IL cortex
pyramidal neurons during behavior (Smith and Graybiel, 2013b).
We first examined the effect of halorhodopsin-mediated per-
turbation of IL pyramidal cell activity in over-trained rats, testing
during the probe session after they had been given reward deval-
uation (Smith et al., 2012). Control rats lacking this perturbation
behaved like normal over-trained rats: they continued to run,
“by habit”, to the devalued goal as well as to the non-devalued
goal. Rats with IL inhibition, however, exhibited outcome sensi-
tivity: they reduced their running to the devalued goal when so
instructed, by about 50%, and thus behaved like rats that had
not received the over-training. This effect replicated the ability
of IL lesions or chemical treatments to block habitual behavior
(Coutureau and Killcross, 2003; Killcross and Coutureau, 2003;
Hitchcott et al., 2007), showing again that removing the influ-
ence of IL cortex over behavior suppresses actions directed to a
devalued goal and shifts them to a more valued one. The optoge-
netic approach further added a critical fact: that IL cortex exerts
powerful on-line influence over ongoing behavior. Avoidance of
the devalued goal occurred within a few trials, amounting to
just seconds of IL inhibition time. Moreover, rats persisted in
avoiding the devalued goal on subsequent days without further
inhibition, and did not rebound or have to “learn again” when
the inhibition was removed; the habit blockade effect endured.
Additional IL perturbation at this stage did nothing to behavior:
animals continued to show elevated running to the non-devalued
goal and decreased running to the aversive goal, suggesting that IL
activity during runs might not be necessary in some contexts for
expressing this outcome-appropriate strategy of behavior (Hitch-
cott et al., 2007; Smith et al., 2012; Dolan and Dayan, 2013).
A major surprise then came when we gave another round
of IL perturbation after the prolonged post-devaluation train-
ing. At this stage, IL neural activity had begun to exhibit the
task-bracketing pattern again, and behavior appeared to reflect
the emergence of a second wrong-way running habit. When
we applied IL perturbation at this time, but not earlier, this
second behavior (putative replacement habit) was blocked with
similar immediacy. The frequency of wrong-way runs suddenly
decreased, and rats ran back to the devalued goal when so
instructed (and drank the reward), whereas control rats continued
their pattern of wrong-way runs. This behavior again endured
over subsequent sessions, and further sessions of IL perturbation
almost entirely returned rats to their originally learned behav-
ior, tested for up to 20 days after the habit reinstatement first
occurred.
During these striking optogenetically induced changes in the
rats’ behavior when instructed to go to the devalued goal, the IL
perturbation had no detectable effect on the instructed runs to the
non-devalued goal at which the normal reward could be found, as
cued. Nor did it affect home-cage intake of the devalued reward
where the aversion persisted even in the presence of IL inhibition.
These results therefore suggested a highly specific impact of the IL
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perturbation on the maintenance of acquired habitual strategies
of running. The IL cortex thus does appear to have on-line control
over habitual behaviors as they occur. This on-line control system
exerts a remarkably rapid, robust, and enduring influence over
behavior, likely reflecting rapid plasticity in downstream targets
of the IL cortex.
Why did the blocked habit come back when the IL cortex was
later perturbed? One possibility is that the IL cortex maintains
newly formed habits, at least for a time. If the task-bracketing
pattern, when present, were to contribute a state in which a new
response strategy can be executed habitually, as in situations in
which it competes with an alternative strategy, then blocking
this IL pattern after initial over-training would return rats to a
prior strategy, namely, outcome-sensitive or exploratory running.
Blocking this pattern again later, after the second habit formed,
would similarly strip this second habit away, and then the prior
strategy—the initial habit—would be expressed. By this account,
the IL does not store initial habits when new ones arise, but does
contribute critically to promoting the most situation-appropriate
ones that have been learned.
This interpretation could carry implications for considering IL
function more broadly as it relates to regulating other learned
behaviors. Famously, the IL cortex regulates extinction learn-
ing across a range of tasks (Morgan et al., 1993; Rhodes and
Killcross, 2004; Peters et al., 2009). The IL cortex also participates
directly in maintaining new strategies in tasks requiring animals
to shift between using spatial cues vs. response plans to perform
(Ragozzino, 2007; Rich and Shapiro, 2009). Depending on con-
ditions, IL inhibition can also lead to a spontaneous recovery of
an extinguished drug-seeking behavior, or can conversely prevent
the return of drug seeking that would normally be evoked by
exposure to a drug context (Peters et al., 2008; Bossert et al., 2011).
One possibility is that the IL cortex is specialized for promoting
a new response strategy at the expense of an older, prepotent
one—be it a new habit, a new response inhibition, or a new
mnemonic strategy (Killcross and Coutureau, 2003; Rich and
Shapiro, 2009; Smith et al., 2012). The many output connections
of IL cortex could support the translation of this general function
into different behavioral effects in different situations (Peters
et al., 2009). Our finding that IL inhibition could both block
and reinstate a particular habit certainly suggests some form of
dependency of IL function on context or history (Smith et al.,
2012).
THE ACTIVITY OF INFRALIMBIC CORTEX (IL) DURING HABIT
ACQUISITION
If IL cortex is critical to the on-line expression of habits, it
could be critical also for the acquisition of habits, given a gen-
eralized form of on-line monitoring or control by this part of
the prefrontal cortex. To test this possibility, we asked whether
optogenetic perturbation of IL cortex could prevent the formation
of a new habit (Smith and Graybiel, 2013a). An advantage of
gene-based targeting approaches, as opposed to lesions or drug
microinjections, is that cell populations can be manipulated
repeatedly without compromising the integrity of tissue. Lever-
aging this strength, we tested, albeit with imperfect layer- and
cell-type-specific manipulations, whether the IL task-bracketing
pattern during the over-training period—the time during which
we had found this pattern to form in conjunction with habit
formation—was critical to the crystallization of the maze run-
ning behavior as a habit. We applied halorhodopsin-mediated
perturbation to the IL cortex on each day during over-training
on the T-maze task. Animals then underwent reward devaluation
and a post-devaluation probe test without further IL inhibi-
tion. The behavior of the animals during the probe test clearly
showed that they had not formed a habit despite being over-
trained. The rats with IL inhibition during the entire over-training
period acted like rats with no over-training experience: they
avoided the devalued goal during the probe task, behaving as
though they had only received initial training to criterion, but
had not been over-trained. This finding demonstrates that the
IL cortex contributes to more than just habit selection—on-line
IL activity during performance is essential for making habits
in the first place, as well as for expressing them once they are
formed.
This finding also underscores the potential of using temporally
precise manipulations for affecting even strongly ingrained and
multifaceted behaviors, such as habitual behaviors, as well as for
testing causal roles of particular on-line neural dynamics (Boyden
et al., 2005; Bernstein and Boyden, 2011; Fenno et al., 2011; Smith
and Graybiel, 2013b). Related work on corticostriatal systems
and action selection has put optogenetic and pharmacogenetic
approaches to use in isolating pathways and cell types necessary or
sufficient for goal-directed behaviors (Gremel and Costa, 2013),
ritualistic behaviors (Ahmari et al., 2013; Burguiere et al., 2013),
behavioral initiation or cessation (Kravitz et al., 2010), and linking
rewards or drugs with behavioral plasticity (Witten et al., 2010;
Ferguson and Neumaier, 2012; Kravitz et al., 2012; Stuber et al.,
2012; Lenz and Lobo, 2013). As we have noted (Smith and
Graybiel, 2013b), research on habits will benefit tremendously
from continued work with these methods and their successors.
CONTINUED REORGANIZATION OF HABIT RESEARCH?
UNFINISHED BUSINESS: BRAIN MECHANISMS
Research is not even close to resolving mechanisms underlying
habitual behavior, even work on the DLS, toward which the
most attention has been paid. The striatum contains multiple
subtypes of neurons (and subtypes of glia) and complex sets of
inputs; and only recently have we been able to study the dynamics
of these components in relation to behavior. Even aside from
behavior, there is rapid progress being made at every level of
analysis of striatal activity; conceptually, each discipline is like
holographic representation of the larger technological revolution
that is affecting neuroscience research directions. In striatal phys-
iology, for example, such technology is producing surprises. For
example, co-release of classical neurotransmitters and neuromod-
ulators, such as glutamate, GABA and dopamine, and complex
interactions among interneurons and projection neurons have
been identified in vivo within the striatum (Stuber et al., 2010;
Tecuapetla et al., 2010). As a second example, stimulation of
cortical excitatory, glutamatergic inputs can lead to predominant
suppression of MSNs in a behaviorally relevant manner, due
to effects of the cortical afferents on GABAergic interneurons
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(Burguiere et al., 2013). So much for the plus and minus signs
in our diagrams!
Given this rapidly changing face of models of striatal organi-
zation and function, it is unclear how the neural recordings that
we and others have made of the striatum during habit learning
relate to underlying mechanisms. Striatal MSNs are divided into
the D1-receptor expressing striatonigral (direct) pathway and
D2-expressing striatopallidal (indirect) pathway (Alexander et al.,
1986; Albin et al., 1989; Graybiel, 1995). Additional compartmen-
talization occurs through the striosome vs. matrix organization
of MSNs, and in the “matrisome” input-output organization of
cortico-basal ganglia circuitry (Graybiel, 1995; Crittenden and
Graybiel, 2011). Recorded neurons do not fall cleanly into cat-
egories that, as yet, map on to this anatomical organization;
there are non-task-related neurons, task-related neurons, reward-
related neurons, and multiple subtypes within each group. Mak-
ing sense of this physiological complexity in terms of anatomical
connections, as well as in terms of intrastriatal neuronal interac-
tion, will be essential for progress toward understanding habits
even just at the level of mechanism in DLS firing dynamics.
Similar points can be made of the IL mechanism driving
habitual behavior. Given the heterogeneity of cell types, laminar
organization, the multitude of inputs and outputs, and the stun-
ning line of studies now coming out revealing the true complexity
of it, much remains to be uncovered. How the IL cortex interfaces
with, or does not interface with, the DLS at different phases of
habit learning and expression is another major focus of inter-
est. Progress can be now made in comparing stimulations and
inhibitions of different pathways or cell classes in either site, or
comparing these manipulations at different points in time, as it
relates to action and habit learning. What habits are, as the brain
sees it, is likely to grow more complex and interesting.
Finally, extending this work to the domain of human behavior
will be important. While the DLS shares anatomical homology
with primate putamen (or primate DLS) and some evidence
indicates a similar functional homology for habits (Tricomi et al.,
2009), it is unclear what the primate correspondent of the rodent
IL cortex is. The IL cortex shares some functional similarity
with the human ventromedial prefrontal cortex in relation to
fear extinction (Milad et al., 2006), and to Broadmann Area
25 in relation to aspects of anatomical connectivity and role in
depression symptomology (Covington et al., 2010; Holtzheimer
and Mayberg, 2011). However, concerning habits, essentially no
links have yet been established.
UNFINISHED BUSINESS: OUTCOME-SENSITIVITY MEASURES AND THE
INSTRUMENTAL/PAVLOVIAN DISTINCTION
There is similar opportunity for progress in characterizing habits
at the behavioral level. The outcome devaluation test has become
a standard for defining behaviors as habitual (aside from tests
of A-O contingency), and it has become common to think of
performance that fails to meet this outcome-sensitivity measure
as an S-R habit. However, there are important qualifications
to consider. Experiments on Pavlovian learning, for example,
have shown that the way in which reward is revalued (e.g.,
high-speed body rotations vs. taste aversion), and the type of
conditioned response being evaluated (e.g., orientation to cues
vs. food approach and consumption), can matter greatly for
measurements of outcome sensitivity (Morgan, 1974; Holland
and Rescorla, 1975; Holland and Straub, 1979; Galarce et al.,
2007; Holland and Wheeler, 2009). One fascinating example,
sign-tracking or auto-shaping (approaching a cue rather than the
source of the reward that it predicts), can in some conditions
appear to be insensitive to outcome associations and habit-like
(i.e., resistant to an omission contingency) (Stiers and Silberberg,
1974; Hershberger, 1986), whereas in other conditions it can
appear as outcome sensitive and quite non-habitual (Locurto
et al., 1976; Robinson and Berridge, 2013).
There are also compelling conceptual accounts of behavioral
persistence despite changes in outcome value that do not refer
to an underlying S-R mechanism. For example, Tolman sug-
gested such persistent behavioral “fixation” resulted from overly
strong “sign-gestalt” knowledge acquired in an environment (Tol-
man, 1932, 1948), Berridge conceives of reward cues as gaining
an incentive value that can become “defocused” or detached
from moment to moment changes in predicted reward value
(Berridge, 2012), and Holland highlights the principle that out-
come representations during behavior can become generalized
(i.e., something good) vs. being percept or identity specific
(i.e., chocolate milk), and that in such former instances they
can simply lose their associability with the reward (Konorski,
1967; Holland, 2004; Holland and Wheeler, 2009). Thus, sen-
sory features surrounding major action events on any task
could potentially instill devaluation-insensitivity through non-
instrumental means, including in our T-maze task. However,
the clear action-related DLS/IL activity dynamics support action
control as the most parsimonious explanation for our findings.
In the broader neuroscience field, strong clues are coming from
work on stereotypic or repetitive behaviors, some of which
have been shown to result from specific genetic mutations in
genes expressed in the striatum and elsewhere (Berridge et al.,
2005; Welch et al., 2007; Burguiere et al., 2013) or in spe-
cific pathways (Canales and Graybiel, 2000; Hyman et al., 2006;
Pascoli et al., 2011; Milad and Rauch, 2012; Ahmari et al., 2013;
Burguiere et al., 2013). Such ongoing research at the mecha-
nism level is sure to help us better understand how persistent
behaviors arise, and the ways in which they can or cannot be
understood as habits. Similar considerations apply to addictive
behaviors.
COMPLEMENTARY BEHAVIORAL MEASURES
Additional measurements aside from outcome manipulations can
be used to indicate that behavior on a task has become habitual,
but it is not always clear how they go together. In the T-maze
studies, we observed a progression of behavior toward outcome-
insensitivity, loss of deliberations, and increase in run speed
and accuracy (Smith and Graybiel, 2013a). Yet, on a trial-to-
trial basis, these measures were not necessarily aligned. Animals
might deliberate at a turn but then approach a clearly devalued
goal. Or they might avoid a devalued goal, yet lack any sign of
deliberative movement. Similarly, we noted that animals slowed
demonstrably in run speed during the unrewarded probe session,
and yet they still displayed total insensitivity to outcome value
and performed accurately; thus, they were behaving by “habit”,
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even though their behavior was slow and partly extinguished.
Much evidence suggests that outcome sensitivity is a better indi-
cator of habitual behavior than accuracy or speed to define a
habitual response (Balleine and Dickinson, 1998). But we need
to gain better ways to distinguish habits and skills. For the
habits we have studied, defined on the basis of their insensitivity
to reward devaluation, multiple behavioral parameters seem to
reflect different structural features of the habits. Habits, according
to our observations, can be compound behaviors, and in their
development can display different components and have mixed
characteristics, for example, being deliberative but outcome-
insensitive. The breadth of the activity patterns that we have
encountered in making multiple recordings from the striatum and
medial prefrontal cortex suggest such compound features as well.
Further, we have not touched upon the insistent, extreme habits
and repetitive behaviors that can arise from exposure to drugs
or appear within the context of neurologic and neuropsychiatric
disorders. Searching for a single definition of habitual behaviors
may be less productive than searching for the multiple potential
circuit-level mechanisms that lead to habits, skills and repetitive
behaviors. Finally, we have not approached the mnemonic aspects
of habitual representations. These are of the greatest interest to
explore.
INTEGRATION WITH COMPUTATIONAL APPROACHES
Computational work related to habit formation has also moved
away from thinking of habits purely in terms of chained S-R
reflexes, favoring instead contrasting behaviors based on stored
state-based action values learned through prediction-error mech-
anisms (i.e., model-free behavior) with model-based exploratory
behavior (Daw et al., 2005a; McDannald et al., 2012; Dolan
and Dayan, 2013). Incorporating the dissociability of outcome
and deliberation-related measures of habits together with perfor-
mance optimization measures might be of particular interest in
formulating the underlying rules of behaviors that have model-
free components. Habits, considered as sequences of actions, can
also, as argued by Dezfouli and Balleine (2012), be captured by
model-based learning rules. This kind of debate underscores the
reorganization that is occurring in our thinking about habits at
many levels.
In the context of our own work, we suspect that the IL cortex
and DLS constitute just two of multiple control systems in the
brain, and hierarchical computational models need to be, and
are being, developed in this domain. Yet, at the heart of the
dual-operator notion that we present for these two regions is
the idea that they have controlling power in shaping outcome-
insensitive and non-deliberative action sequences, distinct from
other co-existing systems important for reward valuation and
performance learning. The neural dynamics, in particular the
chunking pattern of activity with dissociable time-courses of
plasticity and relationships to behavior, suggest that these two
regions and their associated circuits together allow the crystal-
lization of behaviors into chunked action-plans that can be exe-
cuted semi-autonomously despite ongoing changes in the external
world.
MORE TO COME IN EXPLORATION OF HABITS AS A MODEL
FOR STUDYING THE BALANCE BETWEEN FLEXIBLE AND
FIXED BEHAVIORS
We have taken the brain’s perspective in this review, and have
suggested that habits are composed of multiple operators, two of
which are reflected in the neural activity dynamics of the medial
prefrontal cortex and dorsolateral part of the striatum. Evidence
from this work indicates a relation of the striatal DLS to action
chunking and the level of automaticity of the habitual behavior,
and a relation of activity in the IL region of the medial prefrontal
cortex, especially its upper layers, to promoting the formation and
expression of chunked behaviors as outcome-insensitive and non-
deliberative. If we set aside the historical notion of S-R chains
as the sole defining features of ongoing habits (arguably prema-
ture for some habits), we make room for considering flexible
dynamics of neural activity across multiple brain circuits and
their microcircuits as providing the neural structure underlying
habits. We have only touched on the functions of a small set
of regions implicated as being necessary for habit formation, or
necessary for habits not to be formed, as animals explore their
environments. We make the point, however, that the degree of on-
line control over habits by small regions of the medial prefrontal
cortex is remarkably strong, and we make the further point that
the cooperative activity of regions that were once thought of as
acting in opposition actually could be at the heart of the capacity
to form enduring habits, behaviors that are of great value in our
lives.
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